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L. DAVID CONDON*

The Never Ending Story:
Low-Level Waste and the
Exclusionary Authority
of Noncompacting States**
ABSTRACT
The long lasting legacy of nuclear technology in energy, industry,
and medicine is low and high level radioactivewaste. While a workable solution to the problem of high-level waste disposal is many
yearsyet to come, Congresshasfinally, albeitreluctantly, established
a national structurefor the systematic disposal of low-level waste.
Rather than impose its desired scheme on the states, Congress opted
for an incentive system designed to encourage--but not require-the
formation of six to eight evenly distributed regional disposal compacts. The result has been a less than satisfactory mixed bag of large
and small compacts and the so-called "go-it-alone" option.
This article explores the constitutionalproblemsfacing a noncompacting state which might choose to go-it-alone and then attempt to
ban or exclude the importation of out-of-state waste. The commerce
clause forms a solid roadblock to such a noncompacting state. Despite exceptions such as the quarantine and market participantdoctrines, a noncompactingstate cannot ban the importation of out-ofstate waste under the current constitutionaljurisprudence. Whether
the structure of the existing compact system is going to require a
congressionaloverhaul depends upon the states. The effectiveness of
the compacting system may well be determined by the efficacy of the
noncompacting state option.
INTRODUCTION

In the beginning, little attention was paid to the problems associated
with nuclear technology. In the United States, nuclear fission technology
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trophe at Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant in the late 1970s.' Today, public
attention is very much focused on the negative consequences of nuclear
technology. In recent years, there has been increasing public debate over
whether nuclear technology is even worth the price.
Radioactive substances are omnipresent in this country whether they
are used in electric power generation, medicine, research, or manufacturing. Irrespective of the role nuclear technology will play in our future
society, a legacy of radioactive waste products has already been created
which will require care and management for centuries to come. Summarizing the dilemma, Senator James McClure has pointed out that "[tihese

wastes represent one of the challenges of the nuclear age: To utilize
radioactive materials for the general good, but to safely manage for eons
the resulting radioactive waste. "' Low-level radioactive waste is one of

the most pressing problems confronting us today. In 1983 alone, nearly
three million cubic feet of low-level waste was generated in the United
States.'
Low-level radioactive waste, as defined by the 1985 Amendments to
the Low-Level Waste Policy Act (LLWPA)," is all "radioactive material
that ... is not classified as high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, or
byproduct material. . . and [which] the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
classifies as low-level radioactive waste." ' It is currently disposed of by
i. On the evening of March 30, 1979, Walter Cronkite greeted millions of viewers with this:
"Good evening. The world has never known a day like today. It faced the considerable uncertainties
and dangers of the worst nuclear power plant accident of the atomic age. And the horror tonight is
that it could get much worse ...the specter was raised that perhaps the most serious kind of nuclear
catastrophe [next to an atomic explosion], a massive release of radioactivity [could occur]." M.
Stephens, Three Mile Island: The Hour-By-Hour Account of What Really Happened 4 (1980).
2. 131 Cong. Rec. S18118 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. McClure).
3. To be exact, 2,992,826 cubic feet. Nuclear power plants created 1,898,410 cubic feet; private
industry created 869,042 cubic feet; hospitals and university research facilities accounted for 173,604
cubic feet; and government sources generated 51,770 cubic feet. Prochaska, Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 Va. J.Nat. Res. Law 383, 383 n. I (1986), (citing Dept. of Energy,
The 1983 State by StateAssessment of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes Shipped to Commercial Disposal
Sites, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc., Doc. No. DOE/LLW 39T at 1
(1984)) [hereinafter State by State Assessment].
4. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b--2021j (Supp.
V 1987).
5. Id. § 2021(b)(9). Beyond that, low-level waste is put into one of three categories. Class A
waste is the least radioactive in terms of concentration and length of time necessary to become inert;
for example, contaminated rubber gloves, absorbent paper, and glassware. Class B waste must go
through a stabilization process before storage. Class C waste, the most toxic, must be buried with
at least 15 feet of cover to protect against accidental exposure. See Prochaska, supra note 3, at 384
n.9 (citing Ratification of Interstate Compacts for Low-Level Nuclear Waste Management: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 98th Cong., lst" Sess. 60-61 (1983) (statement of John G. Davis, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission) [hereinafter Ratification of Interstate Compacts]). Senator Alan Dixon put it into even
easier to understand layman's terms. Low-level waste "is generally confined to contaminated materials from commercial reactors, hospitals, research institutions, and industrial sites. Low-level
waste decays faster than high-level waste and is measured by volume rather than radioactivity. Lowlevel waste is not spent reactor fuel or radioactive liquids produced by reprocessing, rock and sand
from which uranium has been extracted, or transuranic waste." 131 Cong. Rec. S18121 (daily ed.
Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
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near surface disposal at one of the three operating facilities in the United
States.6 Originally, the Atomic Energy Commission licensed six regional
disposal sites. 7 This system met the needs of low-level waste producers
nationally and more or less evenly distributed the responsibility for disposal on a regional basis. However, serious technical problems emerged;
primarily, the unanticipated collection of surface water in trenches at
several sites-a phenomenon known as "the bathtub effect." By 1978
only the Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington sites remained open.
Although still an efficient means of disposal, the inequity of this situation
placed those host states on a collision course with the entire country.8
Two specific incidents were catalysts toward a national solution to the
low-level waste problem. First, Nevada Governor Robert List closed the
Beatty site in July 1979 after a truck carrying radioactive medical waste
caught fire at the Nevada site entrance, exposing ten people to radiation,
and another "truck carrying supposedly dehydrated waste from a Michigan power plant arrived at the site leaking contaminated liquids." 9 Then
Governor Dixie Lee Ray of Washington closed that state's site and Governor Richard Riley of South Carolina announced that the Barnwell, S.C.
site would reduce by one-half the volume of waste it would accept within
two years (by October 31, 1981)."
The various incidents of 1979 provided the impetus for the enactment
of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act (LLWPA) of 1980." The LLWPA
was essentially designed to encourage states to form compacts for the
purpose of waste disposal. The statute's only leverage was the January
1, 1986 deadline, after which the operators of the Beatty, Richland, and
6. A "near surface disposal facility" is defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as "a
land disposal facility in which radioactive waste is disposed of in or within the upper 30 meters of
the earths surface." 10 C.FR. §61.2 (1985).
7. The six original sites were, in the order they opened: Beatty, Nevada (1962); Maxey Flats,
Kentucky (1963); West Valley, New York (1963); Richland, Washington (1965); Sheffield, Illinois
(1967); and Barnwell, South Carolina (1971). White & Spath, HowAre States Setting Their Sites?,
26 Env't 17, 20 (1984).
8. The West Valley, New York site was closed in 1975; the Maxey Flats, Kentucky site in late
1977; and the Sheffield, Illinois site in early 1978. See Id. at 36. The result was that in 1978, over
75% of the nation's waste was sent to the Barnwell, South Carolina site, 11% to Beatty, Nevada,
and 10% to Richland, Washington. "Yet, during 1978, the three states in which these sites were
located generated only seven and seven-tenths percent of the wastes generated nationally." Hart &
Glaser, A Failure to Enact: A Review of Radioactive Waste Issues and Legislation Considered by the
Ninety-Sixth Congress, 32 S.C.L. Rev. 639, 774 (1981). According to the U.S. Department of
Energy, by 1982 the Barnwell site was home to 14,694,226 cubic feet of low-level waste, or roughly
44% of all low-level waste generated nationally between 1962 and 1982, Id.
9. Hart & Glaser, supra note 8, at 775.
10. See Id. at 775-77. Ray and Riley wrote the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to protest the lack of enforcement of existing packaging and transportation requirements for
low-level waste. The NRC was to develop comprehensive regulations for the disposal of low-level
wastes and thus remove an impediment to the establishment of additional regional disposal sites.
Eventually, the NRC did issue comprehensive regulations for siting, packaging waste for transportation, and operation of disposal facilities. They came out in 1983, more than twenty years after
the first low level waste facility opened. See also White & Spath, supra note 7, at 36.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§2021b--2021d (1982), amended by Low Level Radioactive Amendments Act
of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-202lj (Supp. V 1987).
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Barnwell sites would be permitted to refuse out-of-compact generated
waste (assuming that those sites would be part of a regional compact by
then). Alternatively, they were permitted to levy surcharges for waste
they continued to accept beyond the cut-off date." Other than avoiding
increased costs, there was no substantial motivation for the other 47 states
to expedite the formation of these compacts. As a result, things did not
work as smoothly as planned. In 1983, Richland, Washington was home
to 53 percent of the nation's waste generated to that date. Barnwell, South
Carolina contained 46 percent, and Beatty, Nevada had disposed of the
remaining one percent 3 In fact, no new sites have opened since 1971.
As recently as five years ago, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimated that it would take an average of four years to site, license, and
construct a new disposal facility. Recent experiences by some states have
shown this projection is too optimistic. 14
The basic problem is that no state wants to become host to a waste
facility. Under the LLWPA, only two options were available to each state:
1)join a congressionally approved regional low-level waste disposal compact; 5 or 2) forego joining a compact and attempt to handle disposal
without assistance--or waste-from any other state. Since the three host
states could legitimately close their facilities because of continuing lack
of compliance with packaging and transportation regulations, there was
no real third option for the long term.
The choice between a national, regional, or state-by-state waste disposal system has come and gone for the time being. Which choice might
have been the "best" solution is not presently an issue. What exists today
is a forced marriage of regional and statewide systems. The imminent
question is whether such a system can work. The remainder of this article
examines the inability of a noncompacting state to ban the importation
of out-of-state waste in light of the existing legal and practical problems
with such a plan.
THE LOW-LEVEL WASTE POLICY ACT
Until December of 1980, the Federal Government had exclusive control
over the disposal of low-level waste, 6 (Hereinafter "waste" shall refer
to low-level radioactive waste except where stated otherwise.) At that
12. See 42 U.S.C. §202le(d) (Supp. V 1987).
13. Prochaska, supra note 3, at 385 n. II (citing State by State Assessment, supra note 3, at 2).
14. Id. at 385. Texas started looking for a disposal site in 1981. In February 1984, it anticipated
opening a site by 1988. Due to a host of site selection problems, Texas is not expected to open that
facility until mid-1991, at the earliest. Id. at 385 n. 13 (citing Ratification of Interstate Compacts,
supra note 5, at 92-93 (statement of Robert Avant, Jr., Texas Low-Level Waste Disposal Authority).
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.3 states, "[n]o State shall, without the consent of Congress....
enter into any agreement or compact with another State .......
16. 131 Cong. Rec. S18118 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. McClure). See also
Prochaska, supra note 3, at 385.

Winter 1990]

LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

time, Congress enacted the LLWPA to promote safe and efficient disposal

of this waste.' 7

The publicity generated by [the) site closings, along with the popular
suspicion of radioactivity, so impeded the development of low-level
waste disposal facilities that by late 1979 a near-crisis situation had
evolved. Indeed, at that time, there was only one commercial lowlevel waste disposal facility open in the United States, and the paucity
of disposal sites threatened to halt medical research generating lowlevel waste. "
The LLWPA represented Congress' attempt to resolve this nationwide
lack of sufficient and equitably distributed disposal facilities. The act
established two federal policies. First, the states were to be responsible

for disposing of their own waste. Second, disposal was to be on a regional
basis. 9 Thus, the states were to form regional compacts, and once approved by Congress, they would be able to prohibit the importation of
waste generated outside the compact states' borders.2 All of this was to
occur by January 1, 1986, when the exclusionary authority was to begin.

However, "[gliven the time necessary to negotiate compacts and to construct waste disposal sites, this date was overly optimistic."21
Two problems immediately laid waste to congressional expectations.

One was that the states were very slow in forming any compacts. The
other was that they were not forming into the six or eight large compacts
that the federal legislators foresaw. Instead, the three states with existing
waste sites rapidly formed compacts with neighboring states while the
remaining states grudgingly began to shop around for their own compacts.
By 1985, nine disposal compacts had been formed and at least four more

compacts were in various stages of negotiation, with the January 1, 1986
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§2021b-2021d (1982), amended by Low Level Radioactive Amendments
Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-202lj (Supp. V 1987). See generally Note, Glowing Their Own
Way: State Embargoes and Exclusive Waste-Disposal Sites Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act of 1980, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 654(1985) [hereinafter Note, Glowing Their Own Way].
18. Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 655.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 202ld(a)(l) (1982), amended by Low Level Radioactive Amendments Act of
1985, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-202ij (Supp. V 1987). For an overview of the original regional disposal
plan set up by the Federal Government and the problems that caused it to fail, see generally, Hart
& Glaser, supra note 8, at 772-86; White & Spath, supra note 7, at 17-42.
20. States have formed various compacts to combat problems in areas as diverse as water allocation, crime control, and solid-waste disposal. "The Supreme Court has interpreted the compact
clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl.3, to require congressional approval of compacts 'tending to the
increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States."' New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (quoting Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)). Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 655-56
n. 13.
21. Prochaska, supra note 3, at 386. For 65 compacts covering a variety of subjects, the average
length of time from ratification by the first state until congressional approval was four years and
nine months. With more controversial compacts on river management and water allocation, the
average time was eight years and nine months. Id. (citing F. Zimmerman, The Law and Use of
Interstate Compacts 54 (1961)).
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deadline rapidly approaching.22 As the original compacting period expired, no new disposal sites had opened, and none were under construction."
Experience has shown that the formation of a regional compact cannot
be equated with the more difficult task of finding a host state and actually
opening a disposal facility. On the surface, a "regional" compact system
has evolved.24 Although geographic links exist between the various compacting states, the reason for these links is quite different from that
envisioned by Congress. Rather than true regional waste disposal compacts, what has evolved is in part a system of umbrella compacts. That
is, one state in many of the compacts is the primary waste producer
among those states. That state is now or will soon become the host state
for the compact's disposal facility. The only thing which would change
this arrangement is if a member state increased its output of waste enough
to reach a preset trigger-usually a percentage of the waste produced by
fellow compacting states.' For example, Colorado will be the host state
for the Rocky Mountain Compact after Beatty, Nevada is closed. Colorado
currently generates over 90 percent of the compact's waste. The trigger
there is 20 percent of the region's waste.26 In the Central Midwest Compact, the state generating over ten percent of the region's waste is to be
the host state. 27 The Appalachian Compact is solely between Pennsylvania
and West Virginia. It requires West Virginia, if it generates more than 25
percent of the volume of waste generated by Pennsylvania, to become a
host to its own waste but not that of the region. In effect, West Virginia,
in the worst case scenario, would have to dispose of only its own waste
if its output ever reached the threshold figure.28
Essentially, several states have used the compacting process to create
a system whereby the larger waste-producing states are handling there
22. Id. at 386-87.
23. Id. at 387.
24. The compacts formed as of 1986 were:
Appalachian: Pennsylvania and West Virginia
Central: Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Oklahoma
Central Midwest: Illinois and Kentucky
Northeast: New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, and Delaware
Northwest: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, and Washington
Midwest: Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin
Rocky Mountain: Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming
Southeast: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia
Western: Arizona and California
Id. at 387-88 n.29 (citing Nichols, States Inch Toward 1986, Nuclear Indus. 8 (June 1985)).
25. Id. at 391-94.
26. Id. at 392-93 n.63.

27. Id. at 393. In fact, in 1983 Kentucky generated 2613 cubic feet of low-level waste, whereas
Illinois generated 218,805. Id. at 393 n.72 (citing State by State Assessment, supra note 3, at A-3).
28. That is extremely unlikely since Pennsylvania generated 270,435 cubic feet of waste in 1983;
West Virginia generated only 706. See id. at 394 n.73.
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own waste plus a minor additional amount from neighboring small output
states. The arrangement benefits both small and large waste-producing
states, and this practice certainly comports with half of the LLWPA policy
that the states take responsibility for their own waste. Forming these
compacts from a defensive posture by volume of waste produced is contrary, however, to Congress' desire for a regional disposal system along
the lines of the original six sites. Senator Bradley pointed out that "[tlhe
failure to achieve the intended result of the 1980 act can be largely be
attributed to the act's lack of clearly defined incentives and penalties that
would induce the establishment of new disposal capacity within the nonsited compact regions."'29 The 47 non-sited states basically wanted to put
off this process as long as possible. To achieve this, they "sought to block
the compacts developed by the three States with sites until [those] three
[States] agreed to accept out-of-region waste past 1986."30 It was not
until South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington threatened to actually close
their facilities to all waste-generated in or out of their respective compacts-that Congress got the message. Something had to give, so Congress amended the LLWPA.
THE 1985 AMENDMENTS TO THE LLWPA
Twelve days before the January 1, 1986 deadline, Congress adopted
the Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments (hereinafter "LLWPA" refers
to the 1985 amendments)." These amendments did several things. First,
they moved the earliest available date for exercising exclusionary authority to December 31, 1992.32 Second, they created strong incentives
for those regional compacts and states without disposal sites to locate,
license, and construct disposal facilities. Compacts and states not sited
when the amendments were added face escalating disposal charges for
using present disposal facilities. Furthermore, they must meet specific
"milestones" in developing their own disposal facilities simply to maintain access to present disposal facilities. If these milestones are met, they
are then rebated a portion of the previous surcharge. The combination
of these milestones, penalties, and rebates put the teeth in the- act that
were lacking in 1980. Congress intended for these changes to "provide
sufficient inducement to persuade even recalcitrant States to become part
of the low-level compact process and work diligently to open new disposal
facilities. ""
29. 131 Cong. Rec. Si8108 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
30. 131 Cong. Rec. S18107 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§2021b--2021i (Supp.V 1987).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§2021e(a)(3)(A) & (b)(1),(2),(3) (Supp. V 1987).
surcharges, incentive payments, and penalties
33. Prochaska, supra note 3,at387. The specific
are contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 202le(d)(l) & (2)(Supp.V 1987).
34. 131 Cong. Rec. S18104 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hart).
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Perhaps most important, the amendments defined a "compact" as a
compact between two or more states. 5 This limits exclusionary authority
over out of boundary waste to compact regions, or conversely denies it
to noncompact states by "[making] it clear that a noncompact state is
not entitled to the exclusionary authority that Congress has conferred

upon states that join in an interstate compact approved by Congress.36

Senator Thurmond stated in the debate over the original act in 1980 that
it does:
give advance consent for exclusionary authority as a feature of such
compacts. It is felt that the authority to exclude low-level waste
generated in States outside the boundaries of a region is necessary
to induce State participation in such compacts. Also, case law, including a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of City of
Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), indicates that an
express congressional grant of exclusivity [sic] authority may be a
necessary legal prerequisite to a host State's ability to exclude waste
generated
beyond the boundaries encompassed in a regional com37
pact.

Thus, Congress has twice declined to confer exclusionary authority upon
"go-it-alone" states. Since these states are not members of a congressionally approved compact, they are precluded from exercising exclusionary authority over out-of-state waste.38
The remaining question is whether there is any sort of implied grant
of exclusionary authority in the noncompact states in light of the fact that
specific provisions are made for the existence of such states by the 1985
amendments. The legislative history of the LLWPA clarifies this issue:
"[alt one point in that history, various states and regions and the National
Governors' Association successfully resisted a staff-written version of the
act that would have permitted individual 'go-it-alone' states to exercise
exclusionary authority. The House Energy Committee unanimously deleted this staff-supported proposal." 39 The result was a report by the House
35. 42 U.S.C. §2021b(4) (Supp. V 1987).
36. S. Brand & E. Gressman, Memo to the Executive Committee of the Southeast Interstate
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Committee on Legal Questions Raised by the Executive
Committee 6 (Mar. 12, 1987) (available at the Office of the Governor of South Carolina, Energy
and Nat. Res. Div.).
37. 126 Cong. Rec. S20136 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
38. The applicable statutory language refers to -[a]ny authority in a compact to restrict the use
of the regional disposal facilities under the compact to the disposal of low-level radioactive waste
generated within the compact region shall not take effect before each of the following occurs: (I)
January I, 1993; and (2) the Congress by law consents to the compact." 42 U.S.C. §2021d(c)
(Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added). No where does the statute mention any authority of a noncompact
state to exclude waste.
39. S. Brand & E. Gressman supra note 36, at 7 (citing Brown, The Low-Level Waste Handbook
30 (Nat. Governors' Assoc. Center for Policy Research, 1986)).
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Interior Committee indicating that the 1985 amendments were "not intended to be construed to affect in any way authorities those states may
have under other law to operate disposal site as they deem appropriate
.. .States acting alone, however, are not considered by this committee
to constitute compacts as contemplated under [the 1985 or 1980 acts].'
Thus, although it grants federal regulatory authority, the LLWPA is a
grant of authority to exclude out-of-compact waste to compacting states,
not authority to exclude out-of-state waste to noncompacting states. Read
along with the House Interior Committee's report, the legislative intent
of the act is to withhold the option to embargo low-level waste from
individual noncompact states. Prior to the 1985 amendments, the act
arguably implied that the noncompacting state option was preempted.
More important, the 1985 amendments revoked the automatic grant of
exclusionary power originally contained in 42 U.S.C. §2021d(a)(2)(B)
and instead conditioned exclusionary authority of a compact on congressional approval.4
In the only case specifically addressing the LLWPA (prior to the 1985
amendments), the court in Washington State Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman42 also concluded that the statute granted exclusionary authority solely to compacting states. In Spellman, the controversy was over a Washington State law that banned the importation of
out-of-state low-level waste. Numerous plaintiffs, including the United
States, challenged the statute, which a federal district court struck down
on two grounds. First, the LLWPA preempted state regulation pursuant
to the supremacy clause,4" and second, the state law constituted a violation
of the commerce clause." The district court found that the 1980 LLWPA
"constitute[d] a valid but limited grant of authority" in which only a
"'compactmay preclude disposal of extra-regional waste in the compact's
regional sites."'* That decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit which
held that the LLWPA granted exclusionary authority over waste only to
congressionally approved regional compacts.46
Washington State argued in Spellman that the intent of the LLWPA
was to grant regulatory authority over the waste to the states, including
the immediate authority to exclude out-of-state waste. In rejecting this
40. H.R. Rep. No. 314, 99th Cong., IstSess. 22 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2985.
41. Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 664-65.
42. 518 F Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aftd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Don't Waste Washington Legal Defense Foundation v. Washington, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
43. S. Brand & E. Gressman, supra note 36, at 14, "where a state has not joined a congressionally
approved regional compact in accordance with the 1980 and 1985 Acts, Congress has simply
preempted the field of radioactive waste material." Id.
44. 518 F. Supp. at 931.
45. Id. at 932 (emphasis original).
46. 684 F.2d 630.
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view, the district court pointed out that although the LLWPA speaks
"merely" of state responsibility, only a "compact may preclude disposal
of extra-regional waste in the compact's regional sites." '47 The Ninth
Circuit in Spellman applied a commerce clause analysis in striking down
Washington's ban on the importation of out-of-state nuclear waste."
Washington argued that radioactivity threatened the welfare of its citizens,
but the court concluded that the law failed each part of the three-step
commerce clause test: on its face, 1) it discriminated against out-of-state
waste; 2) it fundamentally lacked a legitimate local purpose; and 3) it
placed a significant burden on interstate commerce."
Congress has made it clear that it does not intend to permit any exclusionary authority over out-of-state waste to the "go-it-alone" states.
It has granted specific authority to compacting states and specifically
withheld that power from noncompacting states. The die has thus been
cast. The question now remains: what alternatives might still be viable
for a state wishing to "go-it-alone"?
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE
NONCOMPACT STATE OPTION
The Commerce Clause
Several states have considered the possibility of going-it-alone and
constructing their own facilities for the disposal of in-state waste." Given
the approaching December 31, 1992 deadline and the open door left by
the LLWPA, the noncompact state option may appear enticing to various
waste-producing states. However, if any individual state tries to ban the
importation of low-level waste, "it is probable that the state's actions
would be held to violate the commerce clause." 5
It is a long standing principle of constitutional jurisprudence that the
commerce clause contains an implied limitation on the power of the states
to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate commerce. 2 The Supreme Court has historically applied an essentially two-tiered test in
evaluating state action that burdens interstate commerce under the dormant
47. 518 F.Supp. at 932. See also, Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 657-66 for
a good discussion of federal preemption of regulatory authority in the low level waste area. The
article points out that Congress assumed the power to control low-level radioactive waste that the
state's have traditionally claimed in the interest of public health and safety. In enacting the LLWPA,
Congress then gave back the limited authority to exclude waste only to states joining approved
compacts.
48. See 684 F.2d 627.
49. 684 F 2d at 631; see also. Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 675, n. 145 and
accompanying text. See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
50. See Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 656 n. 16.
51. Id. at 672.
52. See e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton. i, 209-10 (1824).
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commerce clause.5 3 First, the Court must determine whether the state
action discriminating against out-of-state commerce is "basically a protectionist measure."' The decisive factor is whether the state statute in
question discriminates in favor of state interests.55 An admitted or apparent

economic motive which discriminates against interstate commerce renders
a statute per se invalid.56 The Court will further look beyond the stated
innocuous purpose(s) of these laws, striking them down as facially discriminatory, because "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends."'57 Thus, even arguably honest motives
may not be satisfactory if economic gain, whether or not intended, is the
apparent result of the discrimination. If there are no discernible economic
motives, the Court then considers whether "there is some reason, apart
from their origin, to treat [out-of-state articles of commerce] differently."5
The state statute will be upheld only if the state can advance a legitimate
state interest. Having asserted such an interest the state must make a
credible showing of why that purpose justifies a discriminatory measure.

If successful on that point, or if the burden on interstate commerce is
even-handed (that is, it impacts equally on interstate and intrastate commerce), the Court proceeds to the second element of the commerce clause
test: a balancing of the local interest against competing national interest
53. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.3. The commerce clause has been referred to as "dormant" because
it is not preemptively prohibitive of regulation affecting interstate commerce. This regard for the
"harmonious balance of our federal system, whereby the States may protect local interests despite
the dormant commerce clause, allows state legislation for the protection of local interests so long
as Congress has not supplanted local regulation either by a regulation of its own or by an unmistakable
indication that there is to be no regulation at all." Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
54. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also Note, Glowing Their
Own Way, supra note 17, at 672-73 n. 129 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)
(Court held Oklahoma statute to be invalid as facially discriminatory after inquiring whether or not
it "regulates evenhandedly ... or discriminates against interstate commerce ... [and] whether it
serves a legitimate local purpose.")); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440
(1978) ("[S]tate legislation designed to serve legitimate state interests and applied without discrimination against interstate commerce, does not violate the commerce clause even though it affects
commerce."); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-53 (1977)
(held North Carolina statute discriminates against sale of apples by Washington growers in violation
of the commerce clause "while leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts unaffected".))
55. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 47, 50 (1981).
56. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; see also Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note
17, at 673.
57. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (quoting City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at
626); see also Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 673 n.131 (citing Dean Milk Co.
v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (if this were not the Court's approach, the commerce clause
would be violated only "where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against
interstate commerce")).
58. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
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in unrestrained commerce." The degree of scrutiny applied by the Court
under this balancing test will vary with (1) the "weight and nature" of
the state's interest,' (2) the "substantial[ity]" of the burden on interstate
commerce, 61 and (3) the availability of less burdensome means for achieving the state's purpose.62
The City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey case arose out of facts similar
to those facing states considering the noncompact option in the low-level
waste area. New Jersey passed a statute banning the importation of outof-state solid waste.63 The Court held this was facially discriminatory and
hence a per se violation of the commmerce clause.' 4 The Court did not,
therefore, go on to balance the relevant state and federal interests.65
Although he did recognize the health and safety purposes underlying New
Jersey's law, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, concluded that "the
statute discriminated against articles of commerce coming from outside
the state. "' The Court, thus, rejected self-isolation as a permissible
solution, indicating that the states must find some other means for dealing
with waste disposal problems.
With the City of Philadelphiadecision in mind, Congress exercised its
power to exempt compacting states from the impact of dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence.67 The Supreme Court has recently stated, "[wihen
Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the commerce clause. "" Therefore,
Congress may "confe[r] upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of
interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy.'69 In Lewis v.
BT Investments Managers, Inc.,7 the State of Florida took the position
that it was entitled to restrict out-of-state ownership of certain banking
and investment businesses. The state argued that the applicable federal
law permitted what it characterized as an "incidental burden" on interstate
59. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 624.
60. Raymond Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
61. Rice, 434 US. at 445-46.
62. Pike, 397 U.S. at 144-45; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333, 354 (1977); see also Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 674 & n. 137.
63. 437 U.S. at 618-19.
64. Id., at 625-29.
65. Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 674.
66. Id., at 674.
67. S. Bland & E. Gressman, supra note 36, at 9.
68. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); see also White
v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983) ("Where state or local
government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the commerce clause
even if it interferes with interstate commerce.") Id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 769 (1945)).
69. Lewis v. BT Invest. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980).
70. Id.
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commerce in furtherance of a "legitimate" state interest. 7 The Supreme
Court disagreed stating that Florida had misapplied the federal statute. It
did, however, reaffirm the principle that when federally sanctioned a state
may be permitted to impede interstate commerce. Under the prevailing
jurisprudence, the commerce clause will likely work as a bar against
efforts by individual states to ban low-level waste, as in the City of
Philadelphiacase.
It is now clear based on Spellman, City of Philadelphia, and BT Investment Managers, Inc. that any straightforward ban on the importation
of out-of-state waste is likely to run afoul of the commerce clause. Thus,
noncompact states must either seek a congressional mandate or be more
creative in order to accomplish their goal of banning the importation of
out-of-state generated waste.
The Quarantine Exception
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized a quarantine exception
to discriminatory state action otherwise proscribed by the commerce clause.
States may exclude intrinsically noxious substances, while permitting the
transportation of such items within the state to provide for adequate
disposal.73 Radioactive waste is intrinsically noxious and is potentially a
much greater hazard to public health than the solid waste at issue in City
of Philadelphia.A state might, therefore, plausibly argue that the quarantine exception applies to low-level radioactive waste. 74 The Court ruled
this exception inapplicable in the City ofPhiladelphiacase, because New
Jersey did not evenhandedly impose restrictions on in-state garbage that
it imposed on out-of-state garbage.75
So far, circuit courts have adopted the same reasoning in rejecting state
efforts to restrict both high-level and low-level radioactive waste.76 In
Illinois v. GeneralElectricCo.,7 the court said that a law which arbitrarily
burdens interstate commerce, by banning transportation of out-of-state
items, violated the commerce clause. That case grew out of a dispute
over an Illinois statute which forbade the shipment of spent nuclear fuel
into the state for storage. The law did not, however, prohibit the intrastate
71. See id. at 42.
72. See id. at 47.
73. Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 675 & n. 147 (citing Asbell v. Kansas,
209 U.S. 251, 256, (1908) (diseased livestock); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S.
465, 489 (1888) (infected rags and intoxicating liquors); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473
(1877) (lewd women)).
74. See Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 675, 676 & n. 149.
75. See 437 U.S. at 628-29.
76. See Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631-32; Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.913 (1983).
77. 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
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shipment or storage of the same type of spent fuel. The only distinction
it drew was between in-state and out-of-state generated waste.7" The court
noted:
The efficient disposal of wastes is as much a part of economic activity
as the production that yields the waste as a byproduct, and to impede
the interstate movement of those wastes is as inconsistent with the
efficient allocation of resources as to impede the interstate movement
of the product that yields them.79
In other words, since Illinois cannot prohibit the importation of electricity
or nuclear fuel, neither can it prohibit the importation of the "bad" byproducts of those "goods."'
The General Electric court also recognized the well established quarantine exception to the commerce clause." The traditional exceptions
have occurred in transportation of things such as diseased cattle and
infected rags. 2 The critical distinction between those situations and the
Illinois law in question is that the "hostility" in the former was to the
thing itself. With the latter, the hostility was not toward radioactive waste,
rather it was toward the shipment and storage of that material generated
outside of Illinois. 3 Though willing to condone "undiscriminatory hostility," the court did not accept the state's quarantine argument and struck
the law as violative of the commerce clause."
The analysis employed by the court in General Electric has been broadly
accepted among the circuits thus far. 5 Therefore, a statute would have
to target the transportation of all low-level waste, including intrastate, in
order to rely on the quarantine exception. This, of course, would be
counterproductive to the goal of the noncompact state. Under such a ban,
the noncompact state would be unlikely to find a willing recipient for its
own waste, much less a means by which to transport the waste without
violating its own ban. The quarantine exception, therefore, is not going
to provide the state with the shield it seeks to validly restrict out-of-state
low-level waste.8 6
The Market Participant Doctrine
The Supreme Court, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., established
that the commerce clause analysis did not apply where states were market
78. See id. at 212-15.
79. Id. at 213.

80. "It is irrelevant that the traffic is in 'bads' rather than goods." Id. at 213.
81. Id.at 214.
82. See supra note 73.
83. Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (1982).
84. Id.
85. Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 676. See, e.g., W.C.M. Window Co. v.
Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. See id.
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participants. 7 The market participant doctrine, simply put, holds that the
commerce clause does not limit a state's right to refuse to do business
with any party, particularly out-of-state firms, as long as the state is acting
as a private actor in an interstate market of items rather than as a government regulator of that market.88 If a state became a market participant
in the sale of landfills for low-level nuclear waste, arguably it could
restrict access to its landfills by out-of-state customers.
The Alexandria Scrap case dealt with a Maryland statute that placed
a bounty on junked cars that were cleared from roadsides throughout the
state.8 9 The conflict was created by the statute's requirement that out-ofstate car processors provide greater title documentation than in-state processors in order to collect their bounty.' Maryland argued that the discrimination was not unconstitutional since it was not a "regulation" of
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court agreed that because the state
had entered the market as a purchaser of junk cars the discriminatory
statute was constitutional. 9 ' As a private actor in the junk car market,
Maryland was free to do business as any other business entity wouldthat is, without restriction as to its clients or customers or the terms of
its transactions.92
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,93 the Court significantly expanded the market
participant doctrine. At issue in Reeves was whether or not South Dakota
could discriminate against out-of-state consumers by preferentially selling
the "insufficient out-put" of a state-owned and operated cement plant to
in-state consumers." Finding that South Dakota, like Maryland in Alexandria Scrap, was acting as a market participant rather than a market
regulator, the Supreme Court upheld this practice of discrimination.95
Two points in this decision are of critical relevance to the low-level waste
compacts and "go-it-alone" states. First, the Court emphasized the distinction between a "complex process" and a "natural resource." In Reeves,
the Court found the cement to be the end product of a complex process
rather than a natural resource. It expressly distinguished the City of Philadelphiacase in which solid waste landfills were characterized as natural
resources.' Second, the Court noted that it was of some significance that
87. 426 U.S. 794, 806-10 (1976).
88. id. at 806-08; see also, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).

89. 426 U.S. at 796-97.
90. Id. at 800-01.
91. Id. at 806.
92. Id. at 809-10. Of course, all relevant laws pertaining to commercial transactions applied to
the state here as they would to any other business entity. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
93. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). The decision was, however, by a five to four margin and was accompanied by a stinging dissent. See id. at 447.
94. Id. at 430.
95. Id. at 440-41,446-47.
96. Id. at 442-44. The Court indicated that a cement plant was analogous to a railroad, a mill,
or an irrigation system. Id. at 442 n.6.
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South Dakota had not restricted access to its raw materials (limestone,
etc.) needed to make cement nor prevented "other" private businesses
from building cement plants within the state.97
The first question in applying the market participant doctrine to nuclear
waste disposal is whether the current method of shallow land burial is a
"complex process" or a "natural resource" under the Reeves distinction.
The shallow trench disposal of low-level waste must be characterized as
a complex process for noncompact states to have any chance of availing
themselves of the market participant doctrine. 9
Although the Supreme Court considers simple irrigation systems to
be complex processes, low-level waste sites may involve little more
than shallow "trenches" with unsealed bottoms and mounded earth
"caps." Therefore the sites superficially resemble the sanitary landfills at issue in City of Philadelphia, which the court found to be

natural resources."
However, several factors weigh in favor of low-level waste trench burial
being caste as a complex process. First, solid waste disposal consists
basically of compacting and burying the materials so that they become
part of a landfill. Solid radioactive waste disposal, on the other hand,
relies heavily upon soil geochemistry to minimize the dispersal of potentially hazardous radionuclides into the ground."0 Perhaps even more
important are the complex transportation and monitoring processes in-.
volved with low-level waste due to the radioactive nature of the material. 0 ' It is particularly the monitoring and potential clean-up technology
required after accidents which are, if anything, likely to qualify low-level
waste disposal as a "complex process" satisfying the requirement in
Reeves.

2

Another obstacle to successfully asserting the market participant doc-

trine was raised in South-CentralTimber Development v. Wunnicke. 0 3 In

this case, the Court significantly narrowed the doctrine by limiting the
burden which a state may place on commerce to only the precise market
in which it is a participant. In Wunnicke, Alaska was selling timber from
state lands with the stipulation that this timber be processed within state
prior to exportation. South-Central Timber sued on the grounds that Alaska
was not a participant in the timber processing market and hence was
97. Id. at 444 & n.17.
98. See Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 678. "[clharacterizing waste disposal
as a 'production process ... could be determinative before the courts."' Id. at 678 n. 166.
99. Id. at 678.
100. Hart & Glaser, supra note 8, at 655.
101. See Note, Glowing Their Own Way, supra note 17, at 678 & n. 170.
102. See Hansell, The Regulation of Low-Level Nuclear Waste, 15 Tulsa L.J 249, 255-56 (1979).
103. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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precluded from imposing any restrictions on that market. The Supreme
Court agreed, noting that "[alt the heart of the dispute in this case is
disagreement over the definition of the market."'" Defining the parameters of the "market" is crucial, because the market-participant state is
not permitted to impose any conditions, by statute, regulation, or contract,
that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market. 05
The Court concluded that "unless the 'market' is relatively narrowly
defined, the doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule that
States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even
act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local indusif they
16
try.

'

In the low-level waste area, narrowly defining the "market" is likely
to restrict a market-participant state to in-state disposal only of waste
which it has contracted to handle. For example, suppose the state tried
to ban out-of-state waste by prohibiting the mere transportation of such
waste through the state. Since it would not be bound for an in-state
disposal facility, to do so would be regulation of the transportationmarket
and thus probably void under Wunnicke. So even if a state were successful
in opening and operating a disposal facility, its ability to control its
"market" activities would be severely limited to ultimate disposal, solving
only a small part of the problem.
There is a fundamental issue, however, which arguably calls into question the ability of a noncompact state to ever operate as a participant in
the waste disposal market. Under the LLWPA, the authority and responsibility for regulating low-level waste was delegated to the states. Thus,
the state must license and regulate the operation of any private facilities
within the state. "oImmediately, the noncompact state stands in a tenuous
position as a true "market participant." The majority in Reeves v. Stake
noted that other businesses could enter the cement market in South Dakota, implying that South Dakota would still be a true market participant.
There are not, however, complex licensing and strict regulatory procedures in the operation of a cement plant comparable to the operation of
a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. The noncompact state may
in fact be precluded from becoming a market participant by the delegation
of regulatory authority in the LLWPA. In fulfilling its regulatory function,
it is dubious whether the state could maintain dual status; that is, remain
a market participant while simultaneously regulating such a complex
industry.
Further, Justice Powell strenuously challenged the soundness of the
104. Id. at 98.
105. Id. at 97.

106. Id. at 97-98.
107. 42 U.S.C. §2021c & 2021i (Supp. V 1987).
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doctrine in Reeves v. Stake. Joined in dissent by three other justices,
Powell noted that states frequently respond to market conditions on the
basis of political rather than economic considerations. Acting in fact as
a market regulator rather than a market participant, "it is a pretense to
equate the State with a private actor. State action burdening interstate
trade is no less state action because it is accomplished by a public agency
authorized to participate in the private market."
Thus, noncompact
states would at the very least find themselves suspect at every step of the
way: licensing and regulation of other private facilities, operation of its
own facility, dispute resolution, and so forth.
Consider the Texas plan. Texas does not prohibit the establishment of
privately operated waste facilities within its borders." It does, however,
require each facility to be licensed by the Texas Radiation Control Agency."0
The catch is that no facility may accept waste generated outside Texas,
unless the state of origin has entered into a compact with Texas or has
an operating disposal site that will accept waste generated in Texas. The
effect is to regulate beyond the "market" in which the state is a participant. ' Consequently, Texas' regulatory scheme would still be subject
to commerce clause analysis. Bolstered by Powell's dissent in Reeves,
this limitation is not likely to stand up under the Wunnicke decision.
Regulation of a downstream market is likely to run afoul of the commerce
clause despite the possibility that the state may be a legitimate market
participant in a related market. The final result either way is that the state
becomes more vulnerable to the unrestricted importation of out-of-state
waste.
Another scenario appealing to the noncompact states is likely to meet
with no more success. Masquerading as a market participant, a noncompact state might attempt to use the existing market forces to accomplish
its goal of excluding out-of-state waste., The plan would be simple: establish a state subsidized pricing structure which is so low that it becomes
economically unfeasible for any other profit seeking private business
entity to operate a competing facility within the state." 2
Two problems with this scheme immediately surface. First, the contrived use of state financial resources to subsidize such a system makes
its "market participant" veil extremely thin. As a regulation, the plan
would clearly violate the prohibition against state protectionist measures
as pointed out in the City of Philadelphiacase." 3 The second problem
108. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449-51 (1980).
109. Prochaska, supra note 3, at 398 n. 99.
110. Id.; see also Tex. Rev. Civ. Sta. Ann. art. 4590f, §6 (Vernon 1989).
111.Prochaska, supra note 3, at 398-99.
112. The surcharges established in the LLWPA are the maximum permitted by law. There is,
however, no mention of a pricing floor on the disposal charges. See 42 U.S.c. § 2021e (Supp. V
1987).
113. See 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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would be equally as debilitating to achieving the state's goal. When acting
as a market regulator, a state is immune from antitrust scrutiny." 4 But
where the state is acting as a market participant, it is subject to the federal
antitrust laws just as any other private member of the marketplace." '
The Supreme Court clearly stated in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical
Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories"6 that a state's exemption from antitrust
law "does not apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private
retail market.," 7 In that case, a pharmaceutical association brought suit
over Alabama's practice of buying pharmaceutical goods through its county
hospitals, at reduced prices, then reselling them in direct competition
with other suppliers in the market. The Court held that the Tenth Amendment did not shield those state purchases from the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act"' and any protection that did exist, such as consumption in traditional government functions, must be protected on a
case-by-case basis." 9 The relevant portion of the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, eitherdirectlyor indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . .where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition

with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them. . .

.o

Hence, Alabama was proscribed from using its financial position to discriminate against fellow private pharmaceutical vendors.
Likewise, a noncompact state attempting to set a discriminatory pricing
structure will probably be in violation of the Robinson-Patman Price
Discrimination Act. Deliberately granting discriminately low disposal
prices to in-state waste producers would violate both the letter and the
spirit of the law. Once liable for such violation, the state would also be
subject to the damages' and possibly the injunctive relief'22 granted under
the Clayton Act for antitrust violations.
Thus, the last vestige of hope for the noncompact state has succumbed
to the various traps of the commerce clause and the realities of modem
114. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
115. South-Central Timber v.Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 102 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
116. 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
117. Id. at154.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) & (f) (1988) (amending the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)); see
Abbot Labs, 460 U.S. at 152-55.
119. Abbot Labs. 460 U.S. at 155 n.6.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988) (emphasis added). See also, id. § 13(f).
121. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
122. See id. § 26.
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antitrust laws. A workable legal solution to excluding out-of-state generated low-level waste does not appear to exist.' 3
CONCLUSION
Having come full circle, there does not appear to be a viable solution
for states that exercise the noncompact state option but desire the ability
to exclude out-of-state waste. The LLWPA was enacted, then amended,
with two purposes in mind. First, the responsibility for disposal of lowlevel radioactive waste was to be placed squarely with the states. Second,
the act intended this to be accomplished through the formation of six to
eight regional compacts evenly distributing this burden.
The most threatening, unanticipated barrier to this policy that emerged
was that states did not form up as expected. The three current host states
joined regional compacts in predictable form. However, many other states
were so reluctant to even consider opening a disposal facility that a great
deal of splintering occurred. Many states have compacted with neighboring states usually under some agreement containing triggering mechanisms which limit the amount of out-of-state waste a state must accept
to a modest fraction of the waste they already generate.' 24 The future of
these "compacting states" is unknown. While states may currently comply
with the letter of the federal law, Congress could amend the LLWPA as
it did in 1985 to bring the system back in line with the spirit of its original
vision.
The "go-it-alone" states are in an unenviable position for the time
being. Originally, the Federal Government had preempted the entire nuclear waste arena. With the LLWPA as amended, Congress clearly left
room for individual states to deal with low-level waste as they felt besteven if that included not joining the compact system. Presumably, it is
the desire of a state choosing this course that it will be able to dispose
of its own waste without having to accept waste from any source outside
of the state. Several obstacles exist to this approach, however. First, the
commerce clause is a solid prohibition against a single option state interfering with interstate commerce. The City ofPhiladelphiaand Spellman
decisions leave no real room for a state to place bald restrictions on
interstate commerce.
Two notable exceptions to the commerce clause would appear to provide the answer. First is the quarantine exception. This is an established
principle which permits the state to restrict the flow of interstate commerce
123. See generally Prochaska, supra note 3, at 398-98; S. Brand & E. Gressman supra note 36,
at 13.
124. Considering volume reduction technology and the low threshold triggers, it is very likely
that the volume of waste for which these states will be responsible will be even less than that which
they are currently producing.
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in items which are intrinsically dangerous and threaten the public health
and welfare. Low-level radioactive waste certainly meets that description.
The catch, however, comes in the court's analysis in the GeneralElectric
case. There the court acknowledged the exception, but stated that the
"hostility" must be indiscriminate between in-state and out-of-state goods
(or "bads" if you prefer). Hence, the quarantine exception would not
serve the noncompact state's purpose since it would apply only if the
state banned transportation of intrastate as well as interstate items of
commerce.
The second exception to the commerce clause, and perhaps more important to the noncompact state, is the market participant doctrine. Under
this principle, the state has the latitude to act as any other member of
the market place when it assumes the position of market participant rather
than market regulator. Essentially this means that it may do business, or
not, with whomever it chooses. However, several traps lie awaiting along
this path. The Reeves decision requires that the state not prevent other
private entities from opening a facility within its borders, and the LLWPA
delegates the authority and responsibility for licensing and regulating
these sites to the states. Hence, the state may risk its very status as a
private actor if it must license and regulate other private disposal facilities.
As the Wunnicke decision points out, the Supreme Court has rather narrowly defined the meaning of "market" under this doctrine. Thus, the
state would be extremely limited in the restrictions it could impose, lest
they have an impact on some downstream market or any market outside
the one which the state has entered.
The last and perhaps most fatal blow to the single option state comes
in the form of statutory death. Putting all of the constitutional problems
aside, the market-participant state is still obligated to adhere to the same
strictures as any other private member of the market place. This includes
the federal antitrust laws. Since the market-participant state is admittedly
trying to control the low-level waste disposal industry within its borders,
it is a prime candidate for antitrust problems. As seen in the Abbott
Laboratories case, a state is subject not only to the relevant federal
antitrust law but also to the accompanying remedy, which in Abbott
Laboratoriescame in the form of treble damages and injunctive relief.
Given all of these factors, there is one logical conclusion. The noncompact state, while having the freedom to chose that path, is not likely
to be able to prohibit the importation of out-of-state low-level radioactive
waste. Congress could at any time remove this alternative to the regional
disposal compact. That is not likely to occur until it becomes more clear
whether the regional compact system nourished under the LLWPA will
provide a safe, efficient, and equitable solution to low-level waste disposal. As of now, a state is free to go-it-alone; it simply will not be able
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to guarantee that it can stop the shipment and disposal of waste generated
outside of its borders.
Perhaps even more troublesome is the situation which has yet to occur.
What would happen to a state that is not permitted, for whatever reason,
to join a compact? This noncompact state would not enjoy a compact's
exclusionary authority, nor would it be able to restrict the importation of
out-of-state waste for the reasons discussed in this article. The LLWPA
requires compacts to meet milestones and provides for surcharges to
compacts which fall behind the statutory time frame. It permits noncompact states the option to go-it-alone so long as they also show progress
toward providing for their own waste once the 1993 deadline arrives.
What the LLWPA does not address, however, is what would happen to
a state refused admission to a compact. If it were a new compact, it might
not receive congressional approval; and the LLWPA mandates that existing compacts come up for congressional review every five years after
their initial approval. 2'5 It is too speculative at this point, however, to
say what Congress might do with such a sticky situation. Of course,
Congress could amend the LLWPA again-but in what way? If it granted
exclusionary authority to noncompact states, that would destroy the underpinnings of the entire regional system. A case-by-case consideration
of involuntary noncompact states petitioning for such authority would,
to say the least, be cumbersome if not impossible to administer.
For the time being, a regional compact system has emerged. It is stable,
but its success will not be known for quite some time. However, one
other thing is certain-the issues in this area of public policy are very
fluid and dynamic. The LLWPA received one major revision five years
after its enactment. With problems like the involuntary noncompact state
looming in the not so distant future, the dilemma of low-level radioactive
waste disposal is far from being resolved.

125. 42 U.S.C. §2021d(d) (Supp. V 1987).

